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INTRODUCTION
Corporate government matters not only a firm's perspective at managerial strategies and its economic consequences, but also a valuation of firm's risks and values. The board is the life of corporate government, and the composition of board members plays a relevant role in the function of the board. To protect the board's operations and the right and interests of both shareholders and directors, Directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance offers protections over corporate government settings. Therefore, the D&O insurance as a strategic tool on corporate governance seems to play an important role in promoting the efficiency of corporate governance and then increasing the confidence of market participants and investors (e.g., credit raters). Using credit ratings as proxy for the sophisticated investor's valuations, this study examines the effect of the composition of board members on investor's valuation, and explores whether the effect of D&O insurance would influence the relationship between affiliated directors and credit ratings.
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Credit Rating and Affiliated Director
Prior studies indicate that credit raters are sophistication, experience and use of portfolio strategies, they in incorporating both managerial risk-taking factors and managerial risk-mitigating strategies into their credit risk evaluation (Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009; Alp, 2013; Kuang and Qin, 2013; Bruno et al., 2016) . Prior studies mainly focus on examining the association between credit ratings and financial quality/performance and demonstrate whether credit ratings provide a guarantee for default probability (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Lin et al., 2009; Beaver et al., 2012; Alissa et al., 2013) . From prior fraud cases (e.g., Enron and WorldCom), we know that the quality of corporate government is directly related to financial reporting and default risk; moreover, the board plays an important role in promoting the efficiency of corporate government. Therefore, this study differs from previous studies in attempting to examine the association between credit ratings and corporate government situations by examining whether and how affiliated members of the board affect credit raters' decisions, because affiliated members matter to the mechanism of corporate government and the quality of financial reporting, and assessments of credit risk of companies with high ratio affiliated directors can potentially provide useful and timely information to market participants. Thus, the first research question is as follows:
RQ1:
Whether affiliated directors of the board affect rating decisions.
The Importance of D&O Insurance
Affiliated members are more likely to engage in self-interested strategies and incur shareholder lawsuits than Non-affiliated members, as a result, shareholders and directors are more likely to suffer losses of wealth. Boyer (2014) indicates that there are three ways are recommended to protect the board member's equity and wealth:
Corporate indemnification plans, Limited liability provisions and D&O insurance policies. 1 However, only the D&O insurance policy can protect both shareholders and directors in case of a lawsuit. The function of D&O insurance seems to play an important role in corporate government. Much of the research on the D&O insurance focuses on the managerial opportunism in accounting choice and economic consequences (Zou et al., 2008; Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2014; Woo et al., 2015; Boyer and Tennyson, 2016) . This investigation differs from previous studies in examining whether the function of D&O insurance matters for rating decisions in assessing cases of affiliated directors. Thus, the second research question is as follows.
RQ2: Whether the function of D&O insurance affects the association between affiliated directors of the board and rating decisions.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Data Sources
Our sample was restricted to Taiwanese listed electronic companies over the period 2010-2015 and included in the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. This study focuses on the electronic industry because the available data on D&O insurance is limited. Information on D&O insurance, affiliated director, and financial data were obtained from the TEJ annual files. Cases that did not disclose information related to D&O insurance or financial data were excluded. Table 1 reports the sample distribution. Panel A shows there are 72.23% of electronic observations with D&O insurance. This highest percentage of D&O insurance purchasing seems to imply the importance of D&O insurance. Panel B shows that the non-D&O subsample has a median credit rating of 6, with 11.46 percent in the investment grade rating. Additionally, the D&O subsample has a median credit rating of 5, with 23.03 percent in the investment grade rating; moreover, this percentage is a more-than-double increase than the non-D&O subsample. Overall, the average credit rating in the non-D&O subsample seems to be somewhat inferior to that in the D&O subsample. 
Model Specification-Credit Rating vs. D&O Insurance
To examine the effects of affiliated directors on credit ratings, the research model (1) was constructed. Further, the research model (2) was constructed to examine whether the association between credit ratings and affiliated directors are affected by the function of D&O insurance. Since the TCRI rating is in ordinal scale, research models (1) and (2) are the ordered probit model. Research models (1) and (2) 
where TCRIi, t = Taiwan Corporate Credit Rating Index (TCRI), where the credit rating is divided into ten degrees, with the highest degree representing the highest credit risk; AFFi, t = the number of affiliated directors divided by board size; D&Oi, t = 1 if the company purchases the D&O insurance, and 0 otherwise; AFF×D&Oi, t = this interaction is the AFF and D&O; LOSSi, t = 1 if operating income is less than zero, otherwise 0; ROAi, t = net income divided by total assets; GROWTHi, t = the percentage increase in sales over one year; MBi, t = market value of equity divided by book value of equity; DEi, t = total debt divided by total assets; OCFi, t = cash flow from operations divided by total assets; ZSCOREi, t = the risk of financial distress from the Altman (1968) zscore model; 3 SIZEQUINTILEi, t = dummy variables controlling for size based on total assets; YEARi, t = dummy variables controlling for years; ε = the residual term.
The dependent variable, TCRI, is the TCRI ratings to capture credit risk (Gul and Goodwin, 2010; DeFond et al., 2011) . The test variable, AFF, is the level of affiliated directors, measured as the number of affiliated directors divided by board size. In model (1), the coefficient on AFF is expected to be positive, implying that credit raters
give unfavorable ratings to companies with weaker corporate governance. The test variable, D&O, is an indicator variable equals to 1 if the company purchases the D&O insurance, and 0 otherwise. In model (2), the coefficient on D&O is expected to be negative, implying that credit raters give favorable ratings to companies with D&O insurance when their perceived risk is affected by the function of D&O insurance. Meanwhile, by examining the significance of the coefficient of AFF×D&O, this study can shed light on the association between the function of D&O insurance in mitigating the effects of affiliated directors and credit rating. Following prior research (Jorion et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010; Chandra, 2011; Bentley et al., 2013; Kaplan and Williams, 2013) , where the credit rating is divided into ten degrees, with the highest degree representing the highest credit risk; AFF = the number of affiliated directors divided by board size; LOSS = 1 if operating income is less than zero, otherwise 0; ROA = net income divided by total assets; GROWTH = the percentage increase in sales over one year; MB = market value of equity divided by book value of equity; DE = total debt divided by total assets; OCF = cash flow from operations divided by total assets; ZSCORE = the risk of financial distress from the Altman (1968) z-score model. All continues variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. b D&O (Non-D&O) denotes companies (not) purchase D&O insurance. c Asterisks * , ** , *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. variables. This study further computed variance inflation factors (VIF) for research models (1) and (2), wherein the largest VIF was 3.53 and the mean VIF was 2.06, which is well below the 10 threshold of concern recommended by Kennedy (1998) . Thus, empirical results were not affected by multicollinearity. , where the credit rating is divided into ten degrees, with the highest degree representing the highest credit risk; AFF = the number of affiliated directors divided by board size; LOSS = 1 if operating income is less than zero, otherwise 0; ROA = net income divided by total assets; GROWTH = the percentage increase in sales over one year; MB = market value of equity divided by book value of equity; DE = total debt divided by total assets; OCF = cash flow from operations divided by total assets; ZSCORE = the risk of financial distress from the Altman (1968) z-score model. All continues variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. , where the credit rating is divided into ten degrees, with the highest degree representing the highest credit risk; AFF = the number of affiliated directors divided by board size; D&O = 1 if the company purchases the D&O insurance, and 0 otherwise; AFF × D&O = this interaction is the AFF and D&O; LOSS = 1 if operating income is less than zero, otherwise 0; ROA = net income divided by total assets; GROWTH = the percentage increase in sales over one year; MB = market value of equity divided by book value of equity; DE = total debt divided by total assets; OCF = cash flow from operations divided by total assets; ZSCORE = the risk of financial distress from the (Altman, 1968) zscore model. All continues variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. b Asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed for directional expectations, two-tailed for others.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Column (1) of Table 4 reports the estimated results from the ordered probit model in Equation (1). The coefficient on the test variable AFF was 0.2147, which is significant at the 5% level (z = 1.91), suggesting that credit raters perceive high ratio of affiliated directors as a credit risk-increasing factor and thus are more likely to assign unfavorable ratings to companies with high ratio of affiliated directors. This study further investigates whether the function of D&O insurance affects the association between credit raters (credit ratings) and weak corporate government (affiliated directors). Column (2) of Table 4 reports the estimated results from the ordered probit model in Equation (2). In Column (2), the coefficient of AFF is significant and positive (at the 5% significance level), whereas the coefficients of D&O and AFF × D&O are significant and negative (both at the 5% significance level).
These results imply that credit raters perceive the role of D&O insurance as a credit risk-decreasing factor in mitigating the effects of affiliated directors and thus are more likely to assign favorable ratings to companies with high ratio of affiliated directors when these companies have purchased the D&O insurance.
Further Analysis: Life-Cycle Stage
Credit risk is close related to companies' life-cycle stage, and firm's credit risk taking varies across firm's lifecycle. For example, growth companies may have high credit risk than those companies in the maturity or decline stage because such companies are commonly regarded as risk-taking. Thus, this study includes life-cycle effects into account and employs the methods of Anthony and Ramesh (1992) for the classification of a firm according to lifecycle. In Column (1) of Table 5 , the coefficient on the test variable AFF × D&O was -1.3287, which is significant at the 1% level (z = -3.13), whereas the coefficient of AFF × D&O in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 is insignificant.
Notably, AFF × D&O is significant only in growth companies. These results imply that credit raters not only considered the role of D&O insurance in corporate government to make rating decisions, but their ratings are also affected by different life-cycle stages. , where the credit rating is divided into ten degrees, with the highest degree representing the highest credit risk; AFF = the number of affiliated directors divided by board size; D&O = 1 if the company purchases the D&O insurance, and 0 otherwise; AFF × D&O = this interaction is the AFF and D&O; LOSS = 1 if operating income is less than zero, otherwise 0; ROA = net income divided by total assets; GROWTH = the percentage increase in sales over one year; MB = market value of equity divided by book value of equity; DE = total debt divided by total assets; OCF = cash flow from operations divided by total assets; ZSCORE = the risk of financial distress from the Altman (1968) zscore model. All continues variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. c Asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed for directional expectations, two-tailed for others.
Further Analysis: Industry Supply Chain
The Taiwan electronic industry has the complete supply chain from up-stream to down-stream, and companies of different supply chain stages may face differential industry expertise and risk. For example, the industry expertise of down-stream companies are the most likely to substitute, and such companies are more likely to face high credit risk because of financial and grow constraints. Thus, this study includes supply chain effects into account. In Column (2) of Table 6 , the coefficient on the test variable AFF × D&O was -1.3771, which is significant at the 10% level (z = -1.93), whereas the coefficient of AFF × D&O in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 6 is insignificant. Notably, AFF × D&O is significant only in middle-stream companies. These results imply that rating decisions are affected by effects of different supply chain stages. , where the credit rating is divided into ten degrees, with the highest degree representing the highest credit risk; AFF = the number of affiliated directors divided by board size; D&O = 1 if the company purchases the D&O insurance, and 0 otherwise; AFF × D&O = this interaction is the AFF and D&O; LOSS = 1 if operating income is less than zero, otherwise 0; ROA = net income divided by total assets; GROWTH = the percentage increase in sales over one year; MB = market value of equity divided by book value of equity; DE = total debt divided by total assets; OCF = cash flow from operations divided by total assets; ZSCORE = the risk of financial distress from the Altman (1968) zscore model. All continues variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. c Asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed for directional expectations, two-tailed for others. , where the credit rating is divided into ten degrees, with the highest degree representing the highest credit risk; AFF = the number of affiliated directors divided by board size; D&O = 1 if the company purchases the D&O insurance, and 0 otherwise; AFF × D&O = this interaction is the AFF and D&O; LOSS = 1 if operating income is less than zero, otherwise 0; ROA = net income divided by total assets; GROWTH = the percentage increase in sales over one year; MB = market value of equity divided by book value of equity; DE = total debt divided by total assets; OCF = cash flow from operations divided by total assets; ZSCORE = the risk of financial distress from the Altman (1968) z-score model. All continues variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. c Asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed for directional expectations, two-tailed for others.
Further Analysis: CEO-Duality Effect
The board with the percentage of affiliated directors is a method of strategic management as a corporate governance mechanism, and market participants view this as weak corporate government. Also, CEO-duality is a style of leadership structure as a corporate governance mechanism. However, CEO-duality companies are
